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Terrorist attacks have made security preparedness unquestionably necessary in all cities.
While major metropolitan areas have long recognized that their global visibility has required
strong security operations, many medium-sized cities, specifically those of the U.S. and
European Union, now face the need to establish transportation security frameworks for the
first time. This paper assesses the resources available to help medium-sized cities begin the
task of creating such systems. This assessment presents infrastructure risk assessment tools,
identifies infrastructure and funding resources, and creates a process for developing a
security framework to connect agencies responsible for transportation security in these
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metropolitan areas. Descriptions of transportation security framework practices at the
national level had led to the preparation of a transportation security framework for
Greenville, South Carolina, USA, to serve as a prototype that other medium-sized cities can
emulate. This security framework can serve as either a checklist to ensure security coverage
in existing asset management systems and intelligent transportation systems architectures
such as those frequently used in the U.S., Europe, and Japan, or it can provide baseline
structure for developing a new transportation security framework for cities in developing
countries.
Keywords: Transportation security frameworks, medium-sized cities, urban security,
emergency planning

1. Introduction
Worldwide, terrorist attacks on transportation systems since 2000 have more than doubled
compared to the 1990s. The attacks have further spread to smaller targets and smaller cities.
In 2006, several terrorist attacks focused on medium-sized cities (considered here to have a
population between 50,000 and 1,000,000) and included Chapel Hill, North Carolina; Kufa,
Iraq; Dortmund and Koblenz, Germany; Kandar, Afghanistan; and Tiraspol, Moldova. All of
these attacks focused on smaller targets using cars and car-bombs, suitcase-bombs, suicide
bombers, and grenades, as weapons (U.S. Department of State, 2003).
The United States (U.S.) and other global leaders must adapt to the changing security
environment involving medium-sized cities. Developing a security framework for existing
and proposed transportation systems can aid in the development and coordination of security
plans between many stakeholders and maintain the vitality of the transportation industry and
therefore global commerce. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, the
Transportation Security Administration in the U.S., has formed and allocated large amounts
of money for shoring transportation infrastructure and systems against human threats, but this
funding has not resulted in noticeable security improvements in all modes of transportation
and for all areas of America. Although costly in delay and capital, airport security is
receiving much attention to balance risks and costs. Because there is currently no other
transportation mode that offers the same travel speeds, increased security procedures will not
quickly compromise the airline industry’s market share of the general population for longdistance routes. Public transit systems, however, do not have this luxury and must continue to
offer easy access to maintain passenger ridership. Road infrastructure is similarly difficult to
secure due to its massive network size. Unique security challenges also exist in rail and
maritime shipping. Regardless of mode, transportation system designers and operators must
broaden their focus from mobility and speed to include more security and safety (Okasaki,
2003).
Major metropolitan areas, such as New York City and Paris, have long recognized that global
prominence makes them targets for terrorist attacks, but the threats of the War on Terror
reach into the depths of countries. The September 11th terrorist attacks primarily targeted
average citizens, and average cities also need to be prepared. Just as increased security on
airlines preceded a shift of terrorism to surface modes, increased security in and around large
cities since September 11th could shift some terrorist focus toward medium-sized cities. With
the demonstrated targeting of transportation systems, agencies responsible for these systems
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in populated areas of all sizes need to implement security measures and prepare for
previously unimaginable events.
Although medium-sized cities have more limited resources to fight terrorism, they also have a
smaller number of targets to protect and a relatively smaller number of stakeholders to
coordinate. Establishing transportation security frameworks in these cities could save lives if
universally adopted by all transportation-related agencies. Although local leaders in mediumsized cities might now approach the concept of transportation security frameworks for the
first time, a number of resources already exist to launch such systems. Cities with asset
management systems or intelligent transportation systems (ITS) architectures might turn to
these resources to enhance security and expand coverage.
This paper assumes that significant risks to medium-sized cities justify security planning and
adequate resources exist to develop security frameworks to mitigate these risks. The
objectives of this paper are to:
1. present infrastructure risk assessment tools available for medium-sized cities,
2. identify infrastructure and funding resources available to medium-sized cities for
addressing the risks, and
3. create a process for developing a security framework that applies available resources
for mitigating risks.
The last objective, perhaps the most significant one, will be met by both discussion and the
presentation of a case study of Greenville, South Carolina, U.S.
1.1 Infrastructure Risk Assessment Tools
Asset management programs are used in 75 percent of medium-sized U.S. cities (Wittwer et
al., 2003) to maintain and best-manage their public infrastructure. Such programs will aid in
the development and maintenance of a security framework because key public locations are
already identified and monitored in some manner. Because security requires the proper
selection of areas to protect, choosing high-risk locations for protection requires a careful
selection process.
One strategy for the best allocation of funding in the protection of vital transportation
facilities from terrorism considers the likelihood of the hazard occurring, the socio-economic
importance of the facility, and the consequences of hazards (King et al., 2003). While this
method was founded on intrinsic principles of natural hazard risk assessment, specifically
earthquakes, the identification of key infrastructure is the same for human-made disasters as
they share the same need for an objective assessment of risk.
Similarly, Hood et al. (2003) suggest identifying vulnerability through an integrated
transportation analysis approach, considering vehicle, user, infrastructure, social setting, and
environment as elements. While this approach seemingly requires a large amount of data, it
provides exercises that stakeholders can use to identify these elements and their associated
vulnerabilities or threats. This integrated transportation analysis approach was applied at the
state level to New Mexico, but appears to readily apply to medium-sized cities.
Another framework for risk assessment focusing on highway sections uses both static and
dynamic data. The static data can include infrastructure characteristics and the dynamic data
can include traffic volumes and weather conditions. These factors are important because
high-volume freeway links pose high risks for attacks and because weather, such as wind
direction, might play a significant role during attacks using biological weapons or fire. The
framework produces a risk score for each highway element based on the static data, dynamic
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data, and terrorist attack potential. This risk score allows a systematic ranking of the highway
elements or sections (Xia et al., 2005). Due to a heavy reliance on highways in medium-sized
cities, this method is particularly applicable, but the technologies associated with modern
transportation coordination require attention as well.
Another favoured risk assessment methodology focuses on traffic management centres (TMC)
involved in real-time traffic monitoring. This risk assessment methodology includes asset
identification, vulnerability assessment, threat assessment, consequence assessment, and
countermeasure development (Rowshan et al., 2005). Many medium-sized cities operate
TMCs to manage and control traffic in real-time to mitigate traffic congestion and to improve
safety. As intelligent transportation systems (ITS) continue to gain momentum, the use of
TMCs is likely to become more important for medium-sized cities.
The American Association of State Highway Transportation Officials’ (AASHTO) Guide to
Highway Vulnerability Assessment for Critical Asset Identification and Protection (SAIC,
2002) also provides methods of risk assessment, weighing vulnerability against criticality,
and suggests possible countermeasures, such as motion-activated video systems. This source
also provides a quantitative method for ranking the importance of security needs.
Because each security situation is unique in scope and focus, all available methods should be
examined to determine the best tool for a given job. Medium-sized cities with massive
amounts of transportation infrastructure will likely encounter difficulty ranking their security
needs and should review the methods presented by SAIC (2002) and Hood et al. (2003).
Cities with less transportation infrastructure will not likely need such data-intensive
procedures and might use a hybrid of several methods, for example, referring to Rowshan et
al. (2005) when focusing on a traffic management centre and Hood et al. (2003) to guide
table top exercises to identify and rank other security needs.
1.2 Infrastructure and Funding Resources
Currently, funding from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is distributed by
state. Most states with only medium-sized cities receive no funding from the DHS Urban
Areas Security Initiative (DHS, 2005). Many other grants in the U.S. are based on a formulas
developed by the DHS. One formula weighs critical infrastructure, threat intelligence, and
population density to distribute funding between states and/or cities. The formula aims at
protecting the most people and the largest amount of vital infrastructure (DHS, 2005).
Unfortunately, this formula favours larger metropolitan areas, leaving populations of
medium-sized cities to fall another step behind larger metropolitan areas in protection. Nontraditional sources of funding that require further investigation, might include local gas taxes,
city sales taxes or dedicated state revenue sources.
In the U.S., one contact person in each state receives funding from the DHS and bears
responsibility for distributing that funding as equitably as possible to the variety of small,
medium, and large cities unique to that state (DHS, 2007). While communication differences
exist between states, perhaps a greater challenge exists in that the one contact person for each
state must recognize and manage the security needs of cities of various sizes. Large cities
typically receive focused attention; however, each city within a state should benefit from the
needed communication with the DHS regardless of city size. The current organizational
structure theoretically provides medium-sized cities with similar opportunities for
communication with DHS as small and large cities have. Despite the equivalent
communication possibilities, the practice of interaction reveals an important difference:
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communication and coordination are more easily accomplished within medium cities than in
large cities; however, funding and infrastructure assessment are less likely.
Since funding for large-scale security systems is not as likely for medium-sized cities as for
larger ones, solidifying communication protocols is a more realistic outcome. Best practices
in transportation recognize the importance of communication and coordination, and state-ofthe-practice transportation systems have appeared throughout the U.S. and Europe with
multimodal facilities and systems for passengers and freight. The coordination of systems
creates efficiency and benefits for commerce, society, and the environment; however, as
transportation system users share transportation links, security failures on any given link can
have ramifications on a larger number of system users. Given that providing an
interconnected system requires multiple agencies, these agencies must communicate and
coordinate to ensure transportation security preparedness.
For example, current freight transportation systems are highly interconnected and cargo often
travels on several different modes to reach its destination. The use of multiple trip segments
can cause both mode transfers and security breeches, which can take two forms. First, if
security is increased on one mode while another mode makes no changes, freight operators
might change modes to avoid security delays. Conversely, a lack of security on one mode can
threaten several others because the cargo might not be inspected upon mode change. Because
medium-sized cities have less redundancy and mode choice, security incidents occurring on
one mode might cause extensive disruptions, not only on other modes, but potentially on
neighbouring cities that depend on the same transportation infrastructure. To prevent security
breaches, a consistent quality of security between various modes and stakeholders must be
maintained (Guerroro and Rabkin, 2004). This consistency is difficult to achieve because
stakeholders have varying security interests, standards, and goals.
A transportation security framework can establish responsibility designations among
stakeholders to help maintain consistent security preparations and divide security needs into
smaller, more manageable projects. Development of a transportation security framework will
also address conflicts between safety and security plans. For example, placing a label on the
side of a tanker truck indicating flammable freight can improve safety for incident response
personnel, but it degrades security by labelling a potential target (Guerroro and Rabkin,
2004). A transportation security framework emerges from agencies achieving agreement on
policies such as whether or how to display a label for flammable freight.
As previously discussed, medium-sized cities have fewer responsible agencies than large
cities which simplifies the amounts and types of communication and coordination that need
to take place during and after security incidents. A simpler communication network requires
less planning and fewer resources and results in a simpler, more adaptable, security
framework. Because the security industry must constantly evolve to maintain its
effectiveness, security plans and sometimes frameworks must adapt as well. Therefore;
medium-sized cities have an adaptability advantage over large cities due to their less-complex
frameworks.

2. Process for Developing a Security Framework
A security framework identifies the types of information that needs to be communicated
between agencies before, during, and after an emergency. These agencies could include local
and state police, fire departments, emergency management centres, traffic management
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centres, and the media. This section first reviews previous security framework endeavours
and then creates a simple process for developing a security framework. The latter will be
presented in two parts, first explaining the process and then presenting a case study as an
example.
2.1 State of Knowledge of Security Frameworks
Across the U.S., several agencies at varying levels of geography have formed a base of
experience from which medium-sized cities can draw lessons. Although much of this
experience has occurred at the state level, the principles demonstrated at this level can
transfer to the regions around medium-sized cities. Key themes include the need for strong
inter-organizational leadership, even partial security planning provides benefits, designating
responsibilities and procedures is key, and sharing security information can provide multiple
benefits.
In an effort to depict state security interdependencies, New Mexico’s Security Task Force
developed the Interdependent Systems Framework. This framework development showed the
need for dynamic planning and inter-organizational leadership and action. Developing an
effective security framework requires the cooperation of many organizations, both public and
private, at many levels (Sobel et al., 2005). Since each organization might have unique
opinions and objectives, this process is often challenging. While New Mexico’s security
framework included transportation infrastructure as one of many components, when focusing
specifically on surface transportation security, the agencies involved will change, but the
need for strong inter-organizational leadership remains.
During the emergency of September 11, 2001, Virginia’s State-wide Transportation
Emergency Operations Centre showed that a security framework, even with limited scope,
can facilitate efficient coordinated responses. Although no complete security framework
existed on that day, prior preparations for lesser emergencies included in the agency’s
integrated infrastructure security plan, albeit incremental, aided the agency’s responses
(Pearce, 2003). This case shows promise for developing such a framework in a medium-sized
city. While a well-integrated security framework in medium-sized cities might require a
phased approach to create due to the limited funding available, it could provide benefits prior
to its completion.
California’s standardized emergency management system (SEMS) brings to focus the
importance of standardization in security frameworks. All state agencies in California are
required to use this system, as it provides a standard of operation for any agency, event, or
government level. SEMS development began to coordinate earthquake response and has
evolved to meet current security needs. Transportation agencies in the San Francisco Bay
area created their own transportation response plans that coordinated closely with the SEMS
framework and designates responsibilities and procedures for reacting to emergencies in a
coordinated manner (Okasaki, 2003). SEMS is akin to a security framework because it
provides a communication coordination framework for any incident.
Major metropolitan areas have also demonstrated positive outcomes from the coordination
and sharing of security information. Particularly, Boston, Massachusetts, began an aggressive
surveillance coordination project in 2004, in reaction to security concerns for the upcoming
Democratic National Convention. The project created the Massachusetts Interagency Video
Information System, which manages video feeds from six different transportation agencies.
While connecting these various agencies was a goal of the existing regional ITS architecture,
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these security concerns reduced the completion time of this coordination to only three months
with a cost of less than one million dollars. The system remains today to aid in the traffic
monitoring, safety, and security of Boston (Bond et al., 2005).
Learning from these examples, several other U.S. states and metropolitan areas have
developed security plans. Detroit, Michigan’s, city security plan identifies ways to use
existing technology to improve information coordination. Massachusetts’ state-wide antiterrorism response network was the first of its kind, proceeded by Arizona’s state-wide
security strategy (Beaconfire, 2005). The underlying theme in all of these plans is efficient
and comprehensive communication; also the goal of a security framework.
2.2 Developing a Transportation Security Framework
Security plans must enable fast and coordinated reactions to prevent or limit the severity of
future terrorist attacks and natural disasters. The individual security plans of various agencies
must follow a city or regional framework to ensure the proper coordination and continuing
interoperability. Such agency interaction is often difficult due to the varying interests and
goals of public and private agencies in the transportation industry. Cities of all sizes present
many potential transportation infrastructure targets to terrorists. Similarly, developing
security plans to help protect cities brings many challenges. Creating a transportation security
framework can simplify the process by focusing on responsible agencies, information
communications between these agencies, and infrastructure components, such as tunnel
ventilation systems and dynamic message signs. Providing the right information to the proper
authorities and infrastructure elements can make the difference between repeating the
mistakes of the past and preventing or managing disasters in the future.
In the U.S., a regional transportation security framework can coordinate with the “National
Strategy for Homeland Security” in several areas. Transportation is listed as one of the
thirteen critical infrastructure sectors in the Strategy, and allocating responsibility through a
framework, meets the objective of assigning accountability in transportation security (Office
of Homeland Security, 2005). Creating a transportation security framework will also promote
initiatives of this strategy, including emergency preparedness and response, science and
technology, and information sharing and systems (Office of Homeland Security, 2005).
This paper presents a process for creating a transportation security framework without an
existing regional ITS architecture, but using the U.S. National ITS Architecture for guidance.
A similar process can be followed in Europe by referencing both an applicable regional or
national framework and the European ITS Framework. The transportation security framework
can contribute to a regional ITS architecture by adding security subsystems, parts of larger
ITS systems, not already included; and the regional architecture can contribute already
implemented security subsystems to the new framework. Since the U.S. Department of
Transportation mandates that any transportation project that includes a federally funded
technology component, must follow or develop a regional ITS architecture, these
architectures are becoming more common in medium-sized cities. While this mandate
ensures interoperability with other technologies, it provides an important tool for building a
transportation security framework.
As shown in figure 1, a security framework can be developed in the following steps: 1)
identifying security risks, 2) selecting security services to mitigate risks, 3) developing a
concept of operations, 4) developing an implementation plan, and 5) evaluating the security
framework. This security framework can highlight the security-related subsystems and
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interfaces from either the local, regional, or national ITS architecture. The U.S. National ITS
Architecture addresses transportation security in the following areas: disaster response and
evacuation, freight and commercial vehicle security, hazardous material security, wide-area
alert, rail security, transit security, transportation infrastructure security, and traveller security
(National ITS Architecture, Version 5.1). It also addresses how ITS needs to be secured from
unauthorized use. Leveraging an ITS architecture provides useful information for developing
the security framework. Standards related to communications or interfaces between security
architecture entities must be identified to ensure interoperability between diverse agencies
involved in security preparedness and response. Another important element of the security
architecture is to identify the requirements for securing interconnects and information flows
to prevent unauthorized use, so that the system that provides security is secured itself.
Transportation Security Framework
Identify Security Risks
Select Security Services to
Mitigate Risks

• Historical Data
• Existing Trends
• Expert Opinions
Regional and
National ITS
Architectures

Develop Concept of Operations

Develop an Implementation
Plan
Evaluate

Figure 1. Process for developing a transportation security framework
Step 1: Identify Security Risks: This step includes an analysis of security risks to the regional
transportation infrastructure and includes three parts. First, identify areas in the surface
transportation network that are widely used by the public and are vulnerable to terrorist
threats, such as transit services, tunnels, and bridges. Second, identify different threat
scenarios that could lead to the failure of the selected. Last, rank the risks scenarios from
most probable to least probable in terms of their likelihood to occur. Historical data, existing
threats and expert opinions will be input to this step.
Step 2: Select Security Services to Mitigate Risks: This step will identify alternative security
measures that will mitigate the security threats under each scenario. These security services
can be selected from the market packages in the National ITS Architecture based on the
services that are likely to improve transportation security, such as Transit Security and
Evacuation and Re-entry Management. Some of the security related services already in a
regional ITS architecture, if it exists, will provide input in selecting the security services. If a
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regional ITS architecture does not exist at the time of selection the services, then the selected
services could be used during its future development.
Step 3: Develop a Concept Operations: This step will identify the roles and responsibilities of
each stakeholder in operating the security services. This includes identifying data
requirements of each stakeholder (who will send what data) and communication mediums for
security threat identification and response once an event has taken place. It is of particular
importance to ensure the security of communication mediums for incident response as
terrorists might also try to disrupt these actions.
Step 4: Develop Implementation Plan: This step includes developing a schedule and budget
for deploying the selected services based on priority for regional security. This task should
also include identifying possible funding sources for deploying the security services. Periodic
deployment tracking should be conducted to evaluate the progress according the
implementation plan and revise the implementation plan accordingly.
Step 5: Evaluation: Periodic evaluation will be performed to ensure that the system is keeping
up with changing security risks, stakeholders, and technology. This task will influence the
modification of the selection of security services.
2.3 Case Study of Greenville, South Carolina
This section of the paper uses Greenville, South Carolina, to illustrate how the process for
building a regional security framework indicated in figure 1, can be used for developing a
surface transportation security framework for any city. Greenville was chosen due to its
proximity along a rail and freeway corridor between two larger cities, Charlotte, North
Carolina, and Atlanta, Georgia, and the lack of security architecture. Therefore, a security
incident in Greenville has the possibility to significantly disrupt the transportation systems in
both Charlotte and Atlanta.
Greenville is a quickly growing medium-sized city with an international airport; a smaller,
local airport; but lacks any port for shipping. Greenville provides an excellent role model for
other medium-sized cities due to its reliance on trucking and rail, allowing the procedure
presented here to be rather directly applied to other medium-sized cities with no access to
large waterways.
Regional surface transportation security frameworks should coordinate externally with state
and federal strategies for security. As discussed previously, many states have developed their
own security plans. South Carolina does not have a state-wide emergency management
system used by all agencies. Instead, each county develops its own including an office of
emergency management, therefore; security plans are consistent within each county.
2.3.1 Framework Development
Step one, identifying security risks, was accomplished by an author interviewing personnel
from several key agencies in Greenville including the district coordinator of the traffic
management centre (TMC), the director of the Office of Emergency Management, the chief of
a local fire department, and a captain in the city police department. The list of stakeholders
was started scientifically by contacting agencies with known transportation security
responsibilities, such as the TMC, and was then broadened to include additional stakeholders
according to responses from interviewed agencies. For example, the TMC identified the
names of railroad agencies operating in the area and they were added to the list of
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stakeholders to interview. Each agency had different priorities for the future of transportation
security; for example the city police were interested in recording video data to solve crimes,
but the TMC was not interested because of the number of copy requests from crash victims
they would need to satisfy with an already limited staff. The developed architecture needed to
meet as many of these priorities as possible and the disparity found suggested the need for a
future workshop involving all applicable stakeholders. While this workshop might identify
additional differences, it can more importantly identify solutions, such as recording the data
from only certain cameras, which would satisfy all or most stakeholders.
The next step was to select security services to the mitigate risks to Greenville’s
transportation infrastructure. The interviews with the key participating agencies provided
information on the existing transportation security services and infrastructure in Greenville.
Presently, the main security tool is closed circuit video. Two separate systems operated by the
City Police and the TMC total over 125 cameras. These cameras monitor freeways, arterials,
city streets, and parking garages. Other security infrastructure includes variable and dynamic
message signs, portable surveillance cameras, and various communication systems.
Current security services include monitoring, detecting, and verifying traffic incidents,
providing additional security for special events, and recording video from certain cameras for
possible future review. In the future, more services are likely to be added. Realistic services
in the next five years could include sharing all video feed to a central security location and
expanding monitoring areas.
To aid in this step Turbo Architecture, a program developed for the U.S. Department of
Transportation to make architecture development user friendly to transportation professionals
(National, 2004), was used. The security services selected in this step are classified into
market packages and are described in table 1. While there is great potential for future
development in other subsystems beyond this five-year plan, this framework included
existing and known-planned communication arrangements.
Step three, developing a concept of operations, identified the participating agencies in
Greenville, their roles and responsibilities, and the transportation security framework needed
to provide an information dissemination and communication mechanisms to facilitate
reaction and recovery from emergencies that might impact the Greenville transportation
system. The agencies identified and their respective roles and responsibilities, shown in table
2, demonstrate that linking only the transportation agencies in a medium-sized city involves
much coordination, providing further justification for security frameworks to coordinate
security operations.

European Journal of Transport and Infrastructure Research

Fries et al.

11

Table 1. Market Packages Selected for Greenville, South Carolina
Market Packages Selected
Network Surveillance
Surface Street Control
Freeway Control
HOV Lane Management
Traffic Information Dissemination
Regional Traffic Control
Traffic Incident Management
System
Weather Information Processing
and Distribution
Transit Vehicle Tracking
Transit Fixed-Route Operations
Demand Response Transit
Operations
Transit Security
Transit Maintenance
Multi-modal Coordination
Transit Traveler Information
Broadcast Traveler Information
HAZMAT Management
Emergency Call-Taking and
Dispatch
Emergency Routing
Transportation Infrastructure
Protection
Wide-Area Alert
Early Warning System
Disaster Response and Recovery

Description
Includes surveillance equipment to monitor infrastructure and traffic conditions
Controls local and arterial signal systems to meet demands
Includes ramp metering, dynamic speed limits, and incident detection
Coordinates ramp meters and signals to improve HOV lanes
Provides pertinent travel information to motorists through variable message signs
and highway advisory radios
Coordinates information sharing between traffic management centres
Manages the detection and management of traffic incidents such as crashes,
construction, and special events, such as sports
Used to detect conditions such as icy roads, high winds, and dense fog, to prevent
crashes
Monitors the location of transit vehicles to update arrival schedules
Aids operations management in scheduling and operator assignment
Aids operations management in routing, scheduling, and operator assignment for ondemand transit
Provides the physical security for transit passengers and operators
Supports the scheduling of maintenance and service on transit vehicles
Communication between different modes to enhance operation
Provides users with real-time information about timing of stops
Provides motorists with a source for all transportation information
Combines commercial vehicle tracking and incident management
Provides basic emergency call-taking, dispatching, and routing of emergency
responders
Provides updated routing information in real-time
Includes the monitoring of transportation infrastructure and the barricading and
protecting of infrastructure to prevent incidents
Uses traveller information systems to alert public about emergencies
Monitors looming disasters such as approaching hurricanes
Enhances transportation response ability, supports coordination of emergency
response, and identifies areas for integration

Evacuation and Reentry
Management

Provides support during an evacuation and the subsequent return

Disaster Traveler Information

Uses all available means to provide disaster travel information including damage to
transportation infrastructure and route changes

The next step in developing the concept of operations is to map the communications between
each agency. Similar groups of participating agencies were grouped for simplicity. For
example, all fire and rescue departments were combined as one because geography and type
of security incident will determine which departments are contacted. Similar circumstances
lead to combining all police, all railroads, and all health and medical services. These
communications will most likely evolve according to future input from other organizations
because not all agencies were available for input towards this framework development.
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Table 2. Public Agencies and Responsibilities for Transportation Emergency Response
in Greenville, South Carolina
Emergency
Management

Law
Enforcement

Office of Emergency
Management (OEM)
• Receive info from the State
Law Enforcement Division
• Disseminate info to appropriate
fire/rescue department
• Disseminate info to appropriate
police department
• Disseminate info to Emergency
Medical Services (EMS)
• Serve as Greenville’s first point
of contact for security incidents
• Disseminate info to the S.C.
Department of Emergency
Management
(state-wide
impacts)
Fire and Rescue
• Receive info from OEM
• Receive incident info from
EMS
• Disseminate info to OEM
• Disseminate info to EMS
Emergency Medical Services
(EMS)
• Receive emergency calls from
citizens
• Receive info from OEM
• Disseminate info to appropriate
Police Department
• Disseminate info to appropriate
Fire/Rescue
• Disseminate info to OEM
• Disseminate info to TMC
South
Carolina
Emergency
Management Department
• Receive info from OEM
Greenville (large disasters)
Health and Medical Services
(all hospitals, clinics, etc)
• Receive info from EMS
• Receive info from OEM
• Disseminate info to OEM
• Disseminate info to EMS
Spartanburg County Office of
Emergency Management
• Receive info from Greenville
EOC
• Disseminate info to Greenville
EOC

State Law Enforcement Division
(SLED)
• Serve as South Carolina’s first
point of contact from the
Department of Homeland
Security
• Disseminate info to regional
counterterrorism
councils
(These are considered with in
SLED
for
framework
purposes)
• Disseminate info to Greenville
OEM (or any county)
• Receive info from Greenville
OEM (or any county)
Greenville County Sheriff Dept
• Receive info from OEM
• Disseminate info to OEM
• Aid in evacuation traffic
control
• Provide Law enforcement
during incidents
State Highway Patrol (SHP)
• Receive info from OEM
• Receive info from Transport
Police
• Disseminate info to OEM
• Disseminate info to Transport
Police
• Aid in evacuation traffic
control
• Receive state-wide info from
the
S.C.
Emergency
Management Division
Greenville City Police
• Receive info from OEM
• Disseminates info to OEM
• Receive info from Greenville
Fire/Rescue
• Disseminate info to Greenville
Fire/Rescue
• Aid in evacuation traffic
control
• Provide
law
enforcement
during incidents
Transport Police
• Receive incident info from
SHP
• Disseminate info to SHP

Transportation
Agencies
Traffic Management Center (TMC)
• Receive
info
from
police
departments
• Participate in evacuation plan
with incident detection and
response
• Traffic management
• Disseminate traffic video to city
traffic engineering department
• Disseminate traffic video to web
site
Greenville Transit Authority (GTA)
• Support
evacuation
through
vehicle dedication
• Receive traffic info from TMC
• Receive threat info from OEM
• Disseminate incident info to TMC
Greenville Spartanburg
International Airport (GSP)
• Receive
threats
from
Transportation
Security
Administration (TSA)
• Receive info from Greenville
OEM
• Operate separate police and fire
departments
• Disseminate info to OEM
• Disseminate info to TSA
Norfolk Southern
(Atlanta, GA and Roanoke, VA)
• Disseminate incident info to OEM
CSX (Jacksonville, Florida)
• Disseminate incident info to OEM
Amtrak
• Disseminate incident info to OEM
Greyhound
• Disseminate incident info to OEM
Carolina Piedmont Railroad
• Disseminate incident info to OEM
Pickens Railway Company
• Disseminate incident info to OEM
Greenville City Traffic Engineering
• Receive TMC live traffic image
feed
• Provide signal preemption to
emergency vehicles
• Provide signal priority to transit
vehicles
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Figure 2 shows an example of what information flows can exist between the Greenville
Office of Emergency Management and the Greenville Traffic Management Centre. Note that
while some information flows between both agencies, other information is being only
received or sent, and this is because of the different data needs, capabilities, and resources of
each agency. Although all the information flows between the agencies were developed in this
project, this information will only be released to the appropriate agencies due to security
concerns. Further, properly presenting the information flows requires a large plan-sheet
detailing the types of data each stakeholder is responsible for transmitting and receiving.
Building from this plan-sheet, transportation stakeholders develop or alter their own security
plans to ensure that while their security plans change over time, they continue to provide the
needed functionality to the region’s transportation security framework.

Figure 2. Information flow snapshot
The next step, implementation, outlined the specific projects to materialize the physical flow
requirements identified in the earlier tasks. Specific projects based on the previous steps
include the following:
• Link the Traffic Management Centre video surveillance systems to the City Police.
• Complete deployment of 800Mhz radios and create dedicated channels for agencies.
• Expand surveillance areas within the city and along the interstate.
These projects and others should be prioritized based on the input of participating agencies.
Funding is expected to play a large role in the deployment schedule. South Carolina, a state
containing no major metropolitan areas with population greater than 1,000,000, currently
receives $26 million in annual funding from the Department of Homeland Security, which is
approximately half of the national average for state funding. Further, South Carolina receives
no funding under the Urban Area Security Initiative (Department, 2005). Greenville must
actively pursue both traditional and non-traditional funding sources. South Carolina can
likely make a more aggressive pursuit of federal funding through various Homeland Security
administrations, such as the Office of Domestic Preparedness, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, and the Transportation Security Administration. State and local
sources of funding require further investigation. Ideally, South Carolina should dedicate
funding to the creation and management of security frameworks for the state's metropolitan
areas; however, a line item in the general fund might stand as a required first step. Local
funding will likely come through a similar process. In addition, as Greenville develops itself
as a convention destination, requirements for event security might provide funding for
Greenville's security much like the Democratic National Convention in 2004 did for Boston.
Since this security framework has not yet been fully implemented, this example will not
include the last step, evaluation.
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2.3.2 Anticipated Use
Stakeholders in Greenville should continue this work by holding a stakeholder meeting and
conducting tabletop exercises to identify further security needs. This process would need a
strong champion to lead and organize this meeting and lead this initiative in the future, and
the Greenville Office of Emergency Management would be an appropriate agency. The
concept of operations should be reviewed in the meeting to ensure the proper communication
and coordination among the stakeholders in the event of a security situation.
Stakeholders can discuss projects to improve transportation security in Greenville. Because
the transportation security framework only protects one aspect of Greenville’s security
(transportation), stakeholders can further meld the framework to coincide with other existing
security plans. This coincidence might include refining the information received and
transmitted between the TMC and the City Police. The process can produce updated versions
of figure 2 and table 2. This paper should serve as a tool for law makers and practitioners in
Greenville and similar cities to coordinate transportation security either as a checklist for
existing coordination of systems or as a baseline for developing new frameworks. Following
the guidance of this paper and frequently refining frameworks with input from relevant
agencies will provide an up-to-date information communication map. While maintaining a
successful transportation security framework requires input from multiple agencies to update
risk assessment models and track the deployment and impacts of projects, it will keep
transportation security professionals informed of the precedence of security needs. Even
though cost-benefit ratios have traditionally steered the selection of projects, the precedence
found from a security framework can help decision makers more effectively order projects,
while ensuring that each project continues to promote interoperability and communication.

3. Conclusion
Transportation security is now an important objective of transportation stakeholders, perhaps
equivalent to safety and mobility. The increasing prevalence of terrorist attacks on less
secured transportation targets now brings the security of medium-sized cities into focus.
This paper has presented infrastructure risk assessment tools, infrastructure and funding
resources, and a process for developing a transportation security framework for a mediumsized city. This process was demonstrated through a case study of Greenville, South Carolina,
U.S. While various tools exist to identify security risks and rank projects, working with
participating agencies to develop this prototype project has demonstrated that the precedence
of deployment frequently depends on the priorities and funding available to participating
agencies. Furthermore, this process requires time to bring all stakeholders together to develop
these priorities. As security is a major concern in cities worldwide, where transportation
infrastructures at some point are the means for evacuating the population during disasters, the
importance of having a framework for addressing these security issues related to
transportation is of critical importance.
Medium sized cities in the U.S. and the European Union face particularly unique security
challenges in deploying ultramodern transportation security systems. Though population size
and existing infrastructure seemingly places these metropolitan areas at a disadvantage as
compared to larger cities in terms of grant allocations (using U.S. federal funding formulas),
they have several important advantages. First, their smaller size means that fewer
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participating agencies must coordinate activities to protect a smaller transportation system; a
smaller number of participants can typically make decisions and reach agreement more
quickly than larger groups. Secondly, they can quickly adapt and incorporate a security
framework into future updates of organizational security plans, which can ensure proper
coordination and communication to prevent or manage transportation-related security
incidents. Thirdly, since the vast majority of European cities are similar in scope and
population to Greenville, lessons from this work easily transfer.
Future work should investigate the feasibility of non-traditional funding sources for mediumsized cities to implement security projects identified by a framework, which can ensure
earlier realization of such projects. Further work should also identify how security
frameworks differ for medium-sized cities with access to large multimodal facilities such as
ports, making the findings of this work more broadly applicable.

References
Beaconfire Consulting (2005). A Homeland Security Plan.
http://www.dlc.org/ndol_ci.cfm?kaid=139&subid=271&contentid=250723
2005).

Available at:
(assessed July

Bond, R., Piel, C.-H. and Day, N. (2005). City-Wide Traffic Video Surveillance at the 2004
DNC in Boston: the Massachusetts Interagency Video Information System is a Success.
Paper presented at the 84th Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board, January,
2005, Washington, DC.
Department of Homeland Security (2007). State Contacts & Grant Award Information.
Available at: http://www.dhs.gov/xgovt/grants/index.shtm (assessed October 2006).
Department of Homeland Security (2005). Press Room Press Releases. Available at:
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4097 (assessed July 2005).
Department of Homeland Security (2004). Department of Homeland Security Grants FY05.
Available
at:
http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/Grants_SummaryStLocal.xls
(assessed July 2005).
Guerroro, P.F. and Rabkin, N.J. (2004). Rail Security Some Actions Taken to Enhance
Passenger and Freight Rail Security, but Significant Challenges Remain. Testimony before
the committee on commerce, science, and transportation, U.S. Senate. Publication GAO-04598T, United States General Accounting Office.
Kim, E. (1997). Optimal Demand for Road Investment. The Korean J. Regional Science, vol.
13, no. 2, pp. 75-92.
King, S.A., Adib, H.R., Drobny, J. and Buchanan, J. (2003). Earthquake and Terrorism Risk
Assessment: Similarities and Differences. Presented at the 6th U.S. Conference and Workshop
on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering, August 2003, Long Beach, California, USA.
Miller, L. (2005). Report: 3,400 Air Violations Since 2001. Available
http://homelandsecurity.osu.edu/focusareas/transportation.html (assessed July 2005).

at:

Office of Homeland Security (2005). National Strategy for Homeland Security. Available at:
http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/nat_strat_hls.pdf (assessed July 2005).

European Journal of Transport and Infrastructure Research

16

Transportation Security framework For a Medium-Sized City

Okasaki, N.W. (2003). Improving Transportation Response and Security Following a
Disaster. ITE Journal, vol. 70, no. 8, pp. 30-32.
National ITS Architecture Team (2004). Turbo Architecture Version 3.0. Prepared for the
Federal Highway Administration, April 2004.
National ITS Architecture Development Team (2003). National ITS Architecture Security.
Prepared for the Federal Highway Administration, October 2003.
Pearce, V.P. (2003). Surface Transportation Security Lessons Learned from 9/11. ITE
Journal, vol. 72, no. 9, pp. 38-43.
Rowshan, S., Sauntry, W.C., Wood, T.M., Churchill, B. and Levine, S.R. (2005). Reducing
Security Risk for Transportation Management Centers. Paper presented at the 84th Annual
Meeting of the Transportation Research Board, National Research Council, January 2005,
Washington, DC.
Science Application International Corporation (SAIC) (2002). A Guide to Highway
Vulnerability Assessment for Critical Asset Identification and Protection. Prepared for the
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials Security Task Force.
Sobel, A.L., White, K.R., Hood, J.N. and Albright, D.P. (2005). An Interdependent System
Framework: Development and Initial Application in the State of New Mexico. Paper
presented at the 84th Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research, January 2005,
Washington, DC.
US Department of State. (2003). Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961-2003: A Brief
Chronology. Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, US Department of State.
Available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/5902.htm (assessed June 2007).
Wittwer, E., Bitter, J. and Kasprzak C. (2003). Asset Management and City Government.
Paper presented at the 2003 Mid-Continent Transportation Research Symposium, Ames,
August 2003, Iowa.
Xia, J., Chen, M. and Liu, R. (2005). A Framework for Risk Assessment of Highway
Network. Paper presented at the 84th Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board,
National Research Council, January, 2005. Washington, DC.

European Journal of Transport and Infrastructure Research

